DEVELOPMENTS

Only four months after Chadian rebels attacked and briefly occupied the capital city of N’Djamena, hostilities renewed in the east of Chad on June 11th.  Over a one-week period the National Alliance (NA) rebellion, a conglomeration of three rebel groups, quickly captured towns of strategic importance along the route to the capital.  The rapid progress of the rebel armies led to a tense environment in N’Djamena, where U.N. and Western forces were contemplating evacuation.  

However, on June 19th a “decisive victory” for the Chadian military in the town of Am Zoer, nearly 500 miles northeast of the capital, turned the tides of the onslaught and seemingly put an end to the most recent round of fighting.  The NA is denying that this defeat marks the end of their current campaign, although it remains to be seen how they will regroup after such heavy losses.   Rebel forces will most likely return to their safe haven in Darfur where they are allegedly funded and trained by the government in Khartoum. 

BACKGROUND

Chad has reached the brink of all out civil war multiple times since 2006.  The persistant deterioration of the security situation results from two main drivers.  First, President Deby’s semi-authoritarian regime has resulted in “the absence of domestic political space” and “militarized all political differences in the country.” Deby’s 18 years in power have been marked by coup attempts and rebellions that were violently suppressed.  There has been “systematic, large scale embezzlement of state revenues triggering an unprecedented social crisis at a time [when] oil revenues should have allowed Chadians to live better.”  When running for his third term, President Deby had to contend with a large number of defections by senior officials as well as multiple assassination attempts.  Although the results of the most recent election were challenged by the opposition groups, the international community quickly accepted the outcome in order to avoid further destabilization, while calling for democratization. 

Second, the corrupt socio-political environment in Chad has consistently radicalized opposition parties.  During that time, the Zaghawa (the president’s ethnic group) have generously funded the Darfur rebels and provided them with sanctuary in Chad, as well as weapons to continue their struggle against the government of Sudan.  This support for Darfur rebels has resulted in a tit-for-tat (common for East Africa) competition with the Sudanese government in Khartoum, which has in turn funded, supplied, and provided safe-haven for the radicalized Chadian rebel groups that make up the NA.  The armed opposition to President Deby, however, mostly reflects fringe or minority groups in the population.  A forceful regime change brought about by a successful NA campaign would be unlikely to bring any stability to the troubled country. 

ANALYSIS

There are two main developments that have made this new offensive different from previous incursions.  First, analysts see a possible shift in tactics used by the NA.  Although their rhetoric is similar to that during February’s assault, with chest-beating claims of taking N’Djamena by force, their actions show a shift to an apparent strategy of a war of attrition in the East.  Bjoern Seibert, of the Fletcher School, opined that “The rebels are staging a show of strength and seeking to underline President Deby’s weakness and inability to control the whole Chadian territory.”  Essentially, this offensive seems to have been more of a public relations campaign than a serious attack on the infrastructure of Chad.  All rebel “victories” have been immediately announced by spokesmen based in Sudan and France, and they are broadcast widely by the international media.  This point is further illustrated by the hit-and-run tactics of the NA.  They enter a town, briefly occupy it, then melt back into the bush.  NA spokesmen will next claim there was no resistance by the Chadian military or residents, thus giving the appearance of rebel military strength and support by the local populations.  Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the NA actually had concrete plans to take the offensive all the way to N’Djamena due to the fact that seasonal heavy rains have made much of central Chad impassable.  Instead, many analysts feel that the primary goal for the rebels was to force their way back to the negotiating table without actually having to attack the capital city. 

The second development of importance concerns President Deby’s European backers who have announced their intention to remain neutral.  Previous government successes against the rebels were due primarily to French logistical and intelligence support.  In an announcement on June 16th, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner stated in unequivocal terms that France “will not intervene any more in the Chadian conflict.”  This announcement was treated with satisfaction by the rebel forces.   President Deby condemned the international community in a nationally broadcast address for not coming to his aid despite his recent refusal to meet with a UN Security Council delegation visiting N’Djamena.  Although the current round of fighting seems to be over and the UNHCR has resumed its role in the twelve refugee camps in the east, it remains to be seen how France’s refusal to back President Deby will affect the long-term stability of the Deby presidency. 

DEVELOPMENTS

Iraqi women face a bleak future. A recent survey by the BBC shows that the status of women in Iraq has deteriorated significantly since the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion. It reports more violence against women and fewer feelings of security and optimism. Similarly, Newsweek reports that the return of local religious leadership has translated into fear and violence against women, by those claiming to protect them. Human Rights Watch also reports sharp increases in the amount of sexual violence against women.

However, women are not only the victims, but sometimes the perpetrators of violence as well.  A recent New York Times article addresses the alarming phenomenon of female suicide bombers. On February 2^nd two female suicide bombers detonated explosives in the Baghdad pet markets, killing at least 65 people and wounding over 150. This was not the first female suicide attack; rather, it was symptomatic of a larger, unfortunate trend.

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well, women have played several roles, including those of suicide bombers. The practice, begun by Fatah in 2002, was initially rejected by Hamas; but in 2004, Hamas also sent female suicide bombers. While women historically have participated in national struggles in the Middle East, only a minority have engaged with force.

BACKGROUND

Women in Iraq

The status of women in Iraq has changed often since the 1968 takeover of the Ba’ath party. Considered integral to the Ba’ath plan of power consolidation and economic development, women were rewarded with new laws improving both their public and private status. The 1970 Constitution granted women full equality under the law. Women were also encouraged to attend school and join the workforce.

However, after the 1991 Gulf War and Saddam Hussein’s decision to convert his secular government to an Islamic one, women’s status reverted drastically. Literacy rates dropped, mobility was increasingly restricted, and women were pushed out of the labor force to make more room for men. The number of “honor killings” also increased.

Helping the Resistance: Women in Palestine and Algeria

Historically, Arab women have played significant roles in helping their countries oppose outside powers. Women played an indispensable role in both the Algerian defeat of the French in the Algerian War of Independence, 1954 – 1962, and both Palestinian intifadas.

Hamas’ charter delineates a woman’s role as the “maker of men.” She should educate the new generation and prepare her sons for their duty of jihad and manage her home frugally. The Hamas charter clearly values women’s contributions, and even requires them, yet confines women to thier homes. Algerian women were similarly restricted. The Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) stated in its position paper (the Soummam Platform) that women’s roles included providing moral support to fighters, helping families and children left behind by fighters, and taking care of food supplies. Women have been responsible for providing refuge for “wanted” men, in both Palestine and Algeria. They have also been delegated the task of raising future fighters and politicizing their children at a young age.

Despite these restrictions, some women became engaged in physical resistance. In Algeria, women often followed their fallen husbands or fathers into war. Some also used their veils to hide and move weapons. Female fighters (moudjahida in Arabic) also participated as members of guerilla cells in urban centers, fighters in the mountains in military uniforms, or members in civilian services which at times involved throwing bombs into French civilian centers.

The first known female suicide attack was in 1985 when Khyadali Sana, a 16-year-old Palestinian girl, drove a truck into an Israeli Defense Force convoy killing two soldiers. Similarly, a Nablus woman attempted to plant a bomb in the Tel Aviv Central Bus Station, out of marital obligation–her husband had been accused of being an Israeli collaborator and she wanted to clear his name. Another woman, after her husband divorced her for being infertile, carried out a suicide attack in Jerusalem in 2002, killing one person and injuring ninety. These and other stories illustrate that women’s participation in resistance is often linked to their family structures and duties.

Post-War Improvements in Women’s Rights?

Female involvement in the Algerian War of Independence did little to improve their status within their newly-free country. Similarly in the Palestinian territories, although many women went to demonstrations, confronted Israeli soldiers, and housed fighters, their social and political position in society has remained essentially the same as it was before the uprising.

Palestinian women are said to be “suffering doubly,” once at the hands of Israel, and again at the hands of Palestinian men. Algerian women also continue to suffer as victims of abuse, rape, and murder.

ANALYSIS
The future of Iraqi women remains unclear, as does their role in the insurgence. But the insurgency continues to exploit, intimidate and suppress women and children. There are numerous reports of insurgents forcing Iraqi women to wear veils and killing those who do not. Even more disturbing, the American army has also been suspected of exploiting Iraqi women by using Iraqi wives as bait to capture insurgents.

Yet, some women have aided the insurgency as well, not just by suicide bombing, but also by hiding weapons, cell phones and documents in their clothing. Since the start of the war in 2003, women’s participation as suicide bombers has increased by 30%. There are several explanations for this, including revenge for murdered children, pure nationalism, and fear of bodily exploitation.

As the war continues, the U.S. will hopefully address the special set of challenges facing Iraqi women, dissuading those considering acting as suicide bombers, and protecting all Iraqi women from exploitation and violence. Human rights groups should demand that any withdrawal plans specifically address how women will be protected. Unfortunately, women will likely become casualties of war, left without any security.

DEVELOPMENTS

Japan’s Diet (legislature) passed a new Basic Law on Space on May 21st (the bill can be found in the index on-line here, and in pdf here ), which will permit Japan for the first time to use space for the purposes of contributing to national security. This constituted a marked departure from an almost forty-year-old policy of strict non-military use of outer space.

While the passing of the law received some brief coverage in the Western press , the significance of this development remains largely unexplored. The move is important in two respects - the first being its place in a systematic widening of the scope of Japanese military activity, notwithstanding constitutional constraints, and the second is the extent to which it may contribute to an escalation in the militarization of space among East Asian countries. This article focuses on the first aspect.

BACKGROUND

To put all of this into context one has to begin with the Japanese constitutional constraints on the use of force and maintenance of armaments. Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution provides that Japan forever renounces war and the threat or use of armed force for the purposes of settling international disputes. It also, in Art. 9(2), declares that it shall never maintain land, sea, or air forces or any other war potential, and that the rights of belligerency will not be recognized.

The government’s own long-standing interpretation of these provisions is that while Japan maintains the right of self-defense under international law, and may maintain the minimum military forces necessary to exercise this right of self-defense, it may not use force in any act of aggression, nor may it participate in collective self-defense operations or in collective security operations under the authority of the U.N. Security Council. Moreover, the use of force in combat or other military contexts will not enjoy the immunity from the operation of domestic or other international law normally extended to belligerents under the law of armed conflict.

Article 9 has effectively constrained both the development and operation of Japanese foreign policy, as well as, to a lesser extent, the development of its military. While it currently has sophisticated military forces , with a defense budget that ranks it among the top five in the world (depending on the source and method of calculation ), internal political constraints driven by Article 9 have ensured that its forces are largely defensive in nature (as difficult as it is to make that distinction). For instance, Japan has no long-range bombers, ballistic missile capability, or aircraft carriers, to mention a few of the more important systems of power projection. Even within the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, last renewed in 1960, Japan is under no obligation to defend U.S. forces or U.S. interests outside of Japanese territory, thus preserving the prohibition on collective self-defense.

In 1969, in accordance with the understanding of Article 9, and shortly before Japan ratified the U.N. Treaty on the Principles Governing Activities in Outer Space (the Space Treaty ), the Diet passed a resolution limiting Japan’s use of space to “peaceful purposes.” This in turn was interpreted to mean strictly non-military purposes in order to comply with Article 9. The resolution has constrained Japanese use of space in a number of ways ever since. The government has been precluded from launching satellites for the purpose of defense, which in turn has left Japan reliant upon the U.S. and others for satellite-based intelligence. It also precluded the development and sale of military-grade space technology to other countries, all of which left Japan’s aerospace industry in a relatively underdeveloped state.

A number of events in the 1990s shook Japan’s sense of security and has led to a re-thinking of security issues in a number of ways. In particular, the revelation in 1993 that North Korea was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, followed by the North Korean firing of a Taepodong 2 missile over Japan in 1998, had a profound impact on Japanese threat perception. In 1997, Japan and the U.S. negotiated new guidelines to govern the alliance under the U.S. Japan Security Treaty (the 1997 Guidelines ), which extended the sphere within which the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (the SDF) might be required to operate in cooperation with U.S. forces.

In the post-9/11 world, Japan has come under increasing pressure from the U.S. to contribute further to American security interests. This has included strong pressure on Japan to participate in U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. After considerable debate and in the face of some significant internal criticism, the Japanese government agreed to participate in the development of the U.S. BMD shield, and is in the process of developing a two tiered system, comprising of a sea-based SM-3 atmospheric defense system, and a land-based PAC-3 patriot missile lower level defense system. Japan has successfully tested its SM-3system in the shooting down of a ballistic missile in space in December 2007 .

ANALYSIS

The current move provides authority for the use of outer space for the purposes of national security, and is yet another step in what may be seen as a steady erosion of the constraints on the scope and nature of Japanese military activity. Japan sent the SDF abroad for the first time to support “anti-terrorism” operations in Afghanistan in 2002. This was followed by an unprecedented deployment of SDF forces to provide support in a combat zone, with the dispatch of 400 troops and three planes to Iraq in 2003. Japan even launched military spy satellites in 2003, notwithstanding the 1969 Resolution, to monitor North Korean activities.

All of this has led to considerable debate within the country over the extent to which these developments are contrary to Article 9. One question that received particular attention within the BMD debate, was whether the Japanese interception of a ballistic missile that was targeting the U.S. or U.S. forces not within Japanese territory, would be a violation of the prohibition on the use of force for the purposes of collective self-defense. Similarly, after yet another series of North Korean missile tests in 2006, there was discussion of whether the right of self-defense extended to pre-emptive strikes against missile sites poised for an attack on Japan. There was even talk of re-interpreting the Constitution, and all these scenarios, including that of “reinterpreting” the Constitution are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution itself.

The new Basic Law on Space, while asserting the requirement to comply with the Constitution, as well as the peaceful-use provisions in the U.N. Space Treaty (Art. IV of the Space Treaty), clearly provides that space may be used to contribute to the national security of Japan (Art. III of the Basic Law). Moreover, the Basic Law on Space provides for the development of a space strategy and the establishment of institutional oversight of the program centered in the prime minister’s office.

This needs to be considered in the context of the language of the 1997 Guidelines, which specified that U.S.-Japanese cooperation could extend to “situations surrounding Japan,” a term that was explained at the time as being conceptual rather than geographic. In other words, the scope of Japanese support of U.S. military activity, and the area in which it was authorized to act for its own defense, was ambiguously and circularly defined as being anywhere in which there were circumstances that might trigger Japanese security requirements. Now, with the Basic Law on Space, the “situations surrounding Japan” for such purposes has been extended to outer space.

In addition to North Korea’s attempts in July 2006 to test a Taepodong 2 missile, with a range that could reach the continental U.S., the Chinese recently surprised the world last year by testing its own satellite-killer capabilities. Now, with Japan opening the door to developing its own military space program, the potential for an escalating arms race in space among the East Asian neighbors has become all the more real.

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