DEVELOPMENTS
All eyes are on Beijing as it hosts the 2008 Olympic Games.  Since winning the Olympic bid in 2001, Beijing has come under intense scrutiny for failing to deliver on its Olympic-sized promises of improving human rights conditions in China, especially in the autonomous region of Tibet.  This past March, historic tensions between Tibet and China exploded into the largest pro-independence protest against China in twenty years.  Five-hundred Tibetan monks staged a peaceful protest against Chinese rule, and China immediately cracked down, shutting out all media and dispatching armed police who quashed the protests with gunfire and tear gas.

Amnesty International (AI) recently reported that China’s human rights diplomacy has “deteriorated” in recent months because the country has been cracking down in order to ensure a conflict-free path to the hosting of the Olympic Games.  The organization stated in an Olympic report that journalistic censorship as well as the imprisonment and beating of detainees have all increased; AI pressed world leaders, such as French President Nicolas Sarkozy and U.S. President Bush, to address the human rights issues.  Both presidents have recently confirmed their presence at the Olympic opening ceremony after much deliberation of a boycott.  Chinese officials shot back that AI’s observations showed the bias of “tinted glasses.”  The Olympics may be an immense opportunity for China to cement its status as a rising world power, but thus far, the country’s alleged failure to comply with international human rights standards  has  also proven to be a formidable PR challenge.

BACKGROUND
The issue of “Free Tibet” has been a long withstanding human rights issue ever since the initial Chinese invasion in 1951, which sparked controversy as well as divisive views on how the situation should be resolved.  Initially crossing into Tibet in 1949, the People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China had dealt with minimal opposition as their forces overpowered those of the Tibetan army.

Following this sporadic Tibetan resistance to the Chinese rule, the “Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” was reached between representatives of Tibet and the People’s Republic of China.  These representatives acted without the consent of the Dalai Lama and were under extreme pressure, as the state of Tibet and Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, were under the threat of total destruction by the 40,000 present Chinese troops.

The provisions of the agreement precluded Chinese interference with Tibet keeping its way of life -- namely, its culture, agriculture, language and social system.  Yet, the main issue, which would eventually reach the global forum, was that the PRC would not interfere with the powers of the spiritual and political leader of Tibet, The Dalai Lama. Inhabitants of Lhasa and its surrounding regions claim the Chinese government has not kept these seventeen agreements in accordance with what was signed upon in 1951. 

Over the next eight years, Chinese troops continued to rule over the citizens of Tibet, despite a promise in 1953 from Chinese leader Mao Zedong that troops would leave once Tibet had been fully “liberated.”  These events were the precursor to the political and social unrest of 1959 Tibet.  This period, which led to the slaughtering of thousands of protestors demanding the end of Chinese rule, prompted the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, to leave the traditional post of the Tibetan leader and begin a new era for the exiled government in the Himalayan region of Dharamsala, India.  The serene North Indian city quickly became the government's headquarters for Tibetans and other Buddhists from around the world.  Over 80,000 Tibet citizens followed the Dalai Lama into exile.

The Dalai Lama is both a spiritual and political leader, which often leaves His Holiness straddling the line between decisive action and non-resistance.  To some, his intricate position has branded him as a moderate who would be willing to accept Chinese sovereignty in return for genuine autonomy.  Journalist and Tibet expert Pico Iyer has recently written a book entitled,The Open Road: The Global Journey of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama which outlines the beliefs, travels, and the natural dichotomy that is the life of His Holiness. Iyer outlines the many roles that the Dalai Lama must project to the world at large.  The Open Road shows how the Dalai Lama must be the public source of inspiration as well as the private man constantly pursuing his own enlightenment, the politician as well as the high order of the Buddhist faith, and the loyal Tibet native as well as a leader forced to live in exile. 

Within the Chinese Communist Party, however, the Dalai Lama is not viewed as a diverse man struggling with his role but rather as uncompromising and uncooperative.  Zhang Qingli, the leader of the Communist Party of Tibet, sees the many roles that the Dalai Lama takes on as a prime example of his multiplicity and has even been quoted as denouncing him as “a jackal in Buddhist monk’s robes, an evil spirit with a human face and the heart of a beast.” Despite these opinions, the Dalai Lama has been adamant about supporting the Beijing Olympic Games.

ANALYSIS
With the March 2008 protests in Lhasa and the upcoming Olympic Games, the sensitivity and volatility of the Tibet issue has reached a fever pitch of sorts.  Tibet has been a major thorn in the side of China as the world’s most populous country preps for the world’s biggest event; nonetheless Tibet has not proven large enough of a threat to China so as to induce major boycotts of the Olympics from world leaders or athletes.  China has now taken further precautions, regulating the demonstrations that may take place to certain areas and having protestors register at least five days in advance.  Some would see this as an attempt for the Chinese government to project a sense of ownership over an issue that they are powerless over.

In Early July, both U.S. presidential nominees, John McCain and Barack Obama, reached out to the Dalai Lama to express their concern for the people of Tibet.  Both presidential hopefuls have stood by the spiritual leader.  McCain met with the Dalai Lama shortly after the leader addressed the public in Aspen, while Obama had sent a letter in order to praise the way the Tibetan leader had worked to bridge gaps among people of different backgrounds.  The message of multicultural peace has been consistent within Obama’s extensive political rhetoric.  This type of outreach suggests that both candidates realize a campaign outwardly supportive of a movement such as “Free Tibet” would not only boost foreign relations but also possibly win the hearts and minds of those at home, who seem increasingly disappointed in the economy and the global status of the United States.

Some optimists would have hoped the Olympics this year would produce a sentiment of global unity and human rights for all.  Other world citizens have adopted a different approach to see an optimistic situation, hoping that the attention swirling around Beijing will be an ideal way to raise much needed awareness about the racially and politically fraught situation in Lhasa.  Activists are yet still concerned about the future of Tibet and how it may be ruled.  As the media focuses on Beijing’s Olympic Games, it has also shined a light on the relevance of and urgent need for action against the oppressive rule of Tibet.  Whether the problems of Tibet and the Dalai Lama continue to receive press coverage and international attention once another issue catches the media spotlight, still remains to be seen.
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Aneil K. Pai is a corporate legal assistant at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in New York City. He received his Bachelors degree in Business Administration from the George Washington University in Washington, D.C.

DEVELOPMENTS
On April 5th, 2007, while in Cairo, United States House Majority Whip Steny Hoyer met twice with Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood parliament leader Saad el-Katatni. At the time, the act was construed by some media as an expression of support for recently commenced efforts by the administration of President George W. Bush to expand U.S. diplomatic engagement with independently elected Muslim Brotherhood officials in Egypt. The Brotherhood (known as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen in Arabic), is an influential transnational Salafist movement based in Egypt with affiliates in an estimated 70-odd countries worldwide.  In actions that seemed partly influenced by leading analysts’ recommendations, the United States government’s outreach to the Brotherhood has renewed contacts that the government had not cultivated through non-covert channels since 2001.

After 2001, the Bush administration had taken this stance of non-engagement in part because the administration of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has upheld the legal ban initiated against the Brotherhood in Egypt decades ago.  But as the United States Government seeks to reinvigorate diplomatic partnerships in the region, leading analysts are pushing for enhanced engagement with politically moderate branches of Salafist Islamic movements.  As the largest, oldest, and most influential Salafist movement in the world, the Muslim Brotherhood would be a focal point of such an engagement strategy.

BACKGROUND
In 1928 Egyptian primary school teacher Hassan Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.  Initially the Brotherhood existed to oppose perceived rapid secularization of Egyptian society under British imperial rule, provide social and health services to Egyptian citizens, and restore Islamic rule to Egypt. The educational and social services the Brotherhood has provided in Egypt and elsewhere since its founding continue to be its greatest source of popular support.  Most Brotherhood members are Salafists, adherents to a branch of Islamic thought that follows the fundamentals of conservative Sunni Islamic religious tradition by emulating the practices of Muhammed and his followers from the 7th and 8th century A.D.

Shortly after its founding the Brotherhood formed a paramilitary wing, named the Special Apparatus. In the early 20th Century, it was common practice for Egyptian political parties, on any point of the political spectrum, to have a paramilitary wing. The Brotherhood’s later rejection of its own members’ extremist beliefs spurred the formation of groups such as Hamas and Al-Qaeda, each originally comprised of leaders who left the Brotherhood’s ranks.

Officially, the Brotherhood’s messages on the use of violence as a political tool are mixed; in the 1970s, hoping to boost its political legitimacy in Egypt, the Brotherhood renounced its violent history, but a number of recent violent incidents in Egypt have been linked to the Brotherhood directly, through the Apparatus, or through splinter and dissident groups, recalling the Brotherhood’s violent past.  In the 1950s, the Brotherhood worked closely with the Free Officer’s Movement, which secured independence for Egypt in 1952 and ushered in the leadership of President Gamal ‘Abd Al-Nasser.  Under Nasser the group was initially allowed to operate freely.  Accused of the 1954 assassination attempt on Nasser, the Brotherhood was then abolished by Nasser and thousands of its members were imprisoned, tortured and killed.  The crackdown under Nasser’s regime against the Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations led some of its members to separate from the movement and form more radical and violent groups.  

This pattern of cooperation followed by repression continued after Nasser’s death under Anwar Sadat’s presidency.  Seeking an ally to strengthen his right-wing coalition, President Sadat freed imprisoned Brotherhood members.  Eventually, he too turned against the Brotherhood, arresting thousands.  As democracy was introduced to the region the Brotherhood embraced this political system, seeing in it an opportunity to obtain power and a platform from which they could advance their political agenda.

In 2005 parliamentary candidates affiliated with the Brotherhood, still banned but permitted to stand for election as independents, won 20% of the legislative seats, a surprising feat under circumstances of widespread government intimidation and voter fraud.  Since then, the government has cracked down on the Brotherhood, jailing leaders and arresting thousands of members.  In July, days before elections for four contested parliamentary seats, the Egyptian government detained thirty-nine Brotherhood members.

Differentiation between Brotherhood Factions

The Brotherhood now claims factions in many Arab states and throughout the Western world.  Though springing from the same source, their policies and stances are varied.  In Jordan and Egypt the Brotherhood in theory supports America and its democracy promotion efforts, which the Brotherhood believes would expand its political influence in these countries.  But both organizations support Palestine, oppose the Iraq War and have repeatedly spoken out against the United States, in part catering to their domestic audiences.  The Syrian Brotherhood is staunchly pro-American and supports U.S. Government efforts to remove leader Bashar Al Assad.  In Iraq, the Brotherhood takes an active part in the new government and cooperates with the United States.

The Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF), as the Brotherhood is known in France, is seen as a moderate movement and French government ally.  Though many feared Islamist involvement in the riots of 2005, French intelligence reported that not one participant was affiliated with the Brotherhood.  In fact, the UOIF helped with government efforts to end the riots, often encountering violent resistance from fellow Muslims.  Further, the UOIF acquiesced in French authorities’ decision to ban the hijab (head covering) in its universities.  It has also refrained from participating in pro-Palestinian rallies and Iraq war protests.  The UOIF’s cautious stance contrasts with its British counterpart, the Muslim Association of Britain, whose leaders, such as Sheikh Yusuf al Qardawi, advocate more controversial policies .

ANALYSIS
Last month, in what was likely his last presidential tour of the Middle East, President George W. Bush called for Arab governments to democratize and to allow opposition parties genuine participation in the political process.   

Western analysts opposed to engaging the Brotherhood argue that engagement would condone the spread of Islamist terrorist actors and organizations.   On the other hand jihadists, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, a former Muslim Brotherhood member, condemn the organization for being too moderate and not supporting jihad.

As America continues to seek allies in the region, it is important to identify and engage moderate political movements.  This will require the U.S. Government to view Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood not as single-minded entities but as an association of affiliated groups with ideological differences, to identify those affiliates and their representatives who are viable local and regional partners, and to establish areas of cooperation with them.     

While rhetorically and politically embracing democracy through participation in Egypt’s political process,  the Brotherhood’s commitment to liberal democratic policies is less clear.  The Brotherhood in Egypt continues to function as a political force for social change in part through the charitable and social services it provides to the Egyptian people.  It opposes the succession of Gamal Mubarak, President Hosni Mubarak’s youngest son, to the presidency.  But its parliamentary members are opposed to recently proposed child rights legislation. The Brotherhood does not believe women or Christians should be allowed to become president, and its declared political platform last year included plans for a non-democratically elected religious council with veto power, reminding many of the Iranian Guardian Council.  Yet the platform was opposed by more moderate Brotherhood members, whom some say were deliberately blocked by the government from participating in the drafting process, purportedly to ensure that a more extreme platform emerged than would have otherwise.   

As the Egyptian government continues its crackdown on the Brotherhood--its courts recently sentenced a leading critic of the Mubarak presidency in absentia to two years in prison--it runs the risk of inducing further radicalization by preventing Brotherhood members and secular reformers alike from participating in the political process.  As in the past, the government crackdown could lead members or defectors to pursue further acts of violence.  While America may fear the rise of Islamist movements in Egypt similar to those in Algeria, Turkey and Gaza, it is important to differentiate between these potentially destabilizing institutions and their moderate affiliates.  Through such distinctions the U.S. Government might continue to find opportunities to forge political partnerships in the region that build on its recent outreach efforts to the Brotherhood in Egypt.

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Ms. El-Sadek is a graduate of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.  She has designed and managed democracy promotion and community development projects in the Middle East and the Caucuses and is currently pursuing a J.D. at New York University School of Law.

DEVELOPMENTS
Radovan Karadzic was arrested in Belgrade, Serbia, on July 21 after more than a decade in hiding.  There have been riots and protests in Belgrade from Karadzic supporters, and celebration in Sarajevo.  Officials of Republika Srpska (RS), the Bosnian Serb political entity, criticized the Bosnian government’s celebration.

Karadzic has since been transferred to The Hague to stand before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  At an initial hearing, he alleged irregularities in his arrest and reiterated his assertion — first made to Serbian media in March 2007 — that he and American diplomat Richard Holbrooke cut a deal in 1996 ensuring him legal immunity in return for his staying out of sight and not attempting to block the implementation of the Dayton Accords.
 
BACKGROUND
Karadzic was the president of the RS during the conflict in the 1990s.  He had served as president of the Serbian Democratic Party and, as Bosnia prepared for independence, he organized parallel Serbian governing institutions which grew into the fully separate political entity Republika Srpska (today one of two entities that comprise the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

ICTY accuses him of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide during the conflict, and reports indicate that he ordered the attack on Srebrenica — the only place in the conflict that an international court has determined genocide, rather than crimes against humanity, occurred.  As many as 8,000 Muslim men and boys died in the attack.

Karadzic had been living in hiding in Belgrade, under an adopted name, in disguise, and working as a practitioner of alternative medicine.

The arrest comes as a relatively pro-Western Serbian government, under President Boris Tadic, seeks integration into the European Union and continues to resist Kosovo’s independence.  Tadic, who expressed satisfaction with Karadzic’s arrest but cautioned that Serbs would expect a fair and impartial trial from ICTY, has faced death threats from Serbian extremists for his pro-Western attitude.

ANALYSIS

The arrest of Karadzic naturally eases diplomatic pressure on Serbia, which had been accused of dilatory conduct in turning over domestic war crimes indictees to international courts.  This arrest — especially if followed by the arrest and transfer to The Hague of General Ratko Mladic, the second highest-ranking war crimes suspect still at large from the Bosnian conflict — should facilitate Serbian accession into the EU and thaw relations between Serbia and the West.  Serbia has recently returned its ambassadors to EU countries that recognized Kosovo and is making an increased push for implementation of their EU Stabilization and Association Agreement, which is the first step toward closer integration with the European Union.  A provisional trade agreement is anticipated next month, and Serbia has already signed a military partnership agreement with NATO.  This is despite Serbia’s recent harder line on Kosovar independence, including litigating the legality of secession in the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Commentator Andre Gerolymatos argues that more is at stake for Serbia than EU accession — friendly relations with the West could allow Serbia to start a bidding war for Serbia’s petroleum industry, rather than accept a below-market Russian offer.  Serbia has since announced that it will renegotiate the Russian offer, a possible precursor to a more robust bidding process.  Gerolymatos notes that there will be consequences for pipeline projects across Eastern Europe.

In short, Serbia appears to have prioritized Western integration, a freer hand in Kosovo (including an ability to protect Kosovo’s Serbian minority, mostly concentrated in the north of Kosovo near the Serbian border, and strive for eventual partition), and deriving full value from its domestic oil industry over protecting Karadzic from arrest.

Though the news of Karadzic’s arrest was met with celebration in Sarajevo and consternation in Belgrade, the consequences for Bosnia are much murkier than those for Serbia.  Former U.N. High Commissioner for Bosnia & Herzegovina Paddy Ashdown wrote that RS secession is becoming increasingly likely.  If secession occurs, the consequences for minorities in each region could be serious, and further de facto ethnic cleansing — or even renewed violence — could occur.  Bosnia’s high prosecutor is investigating the support network that sustained Karadzic, and further arrests will likely be forthcoming.  Public reaction to those arrests will be telling.

For the United States and other Western countries, Karadzic’s arrest is joyful news, but tempered by the recognition that it alters the diplomatic situation and creates new challenges.  The West must — as it has — reward Serbia for taking action to arrest Karadzic, and so reinforce the relatively pro-Western Tadic government in Belgrade.  At the same time, the West must move slowly enough on integration to encourage Serbia to take further conciliatory actions, including the eventual arrest and extradition of genocide suspect General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Army of RS during the conflict.  The West also must continue to manage the delicate process of Kosovar independence and resist the Serbian diplomatic offensive against recognition.  Balancing support for Kosovo with continued incentives for Serbia to encourage further EU integration and cooperation with the ICTY will be a difficult task.

Finally, Karadzic’s trial itself will be no mere formality.  Like Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Karadzic will represent himself before the ICTY.  Allowing the trial to become a circus — as often happens when accused war criminals represent themselves in court — or a sounding board for Karadzic’s personal political views will weaken the tribunal’s credibility in Bosnia, where international courts are already mistrusted because of the ICJ’s ruling last year declining to find Serbia directly responsible for the Srebrenica genocide.  Karadzic’s allegations that he was guaranteed immunity by the State Department will be aired and re-aired at trial and debated throughout the Balkans.  Richard Holbrooke has rebutted them strongly, and in a swearing match Bosnians will probably tend to believe the person who is not accused of genocide against them.  Should Karadzic’s assertions of a deal gain public traction, they could dramatically damage U.S. relations with Bosnia, which has been a reliable American ally since Dayton.  However, should the trial run smoothly, and be followed by the arrest and conviction of General Mladic, it may finally provide needed closure on the conflict and enable the people of the Balkans to move forward.

In sum, Karadzic’s arrest is a great opportunity for the region and for the world.  Handled properly, it can promote regional reconciliation and Serbian integration into the West.  However, both diplomats and jurists face a difficult task in handling it properly, and missteps or a variety of external threats could destabilize Balkan integration into Europe, America’s relationship with various Balkan states, the independence process of the world’s newest nation, or Serbia’s own government.

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Mr. Traldi is a contributing editor to Foreign Policy Digest and is an attorney with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  He previously worked with the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina.

DEVELOPMENTS
Despite the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, relations between the West and Russia remain critically important to global peace, security, and prosperity today.  Sustained and predictable dialogue between the two is essential to ensuring cooperation on a host of global issues, from trade to climate change to conflict resolution.  As part of the latest discussions, the European Union (EU) and Russia launched talks in early July 2008 on a new partnership between Brussels and Moscow.  A new agreement is especially important now, given recent developments such as the enlargement of the EU, the leadership transition in Moscow, and changed global dynamics which see Russia playing a far more assertive role in world affairs than in the recent past.

A central focus of EU-Russia relations is energy security, given that nearly 30% of the EU’s oil imports and 50% of Europe’s natural gas imports presently come from Russia.  These numbers are set to rise rapidly over the coming years.  Dependence on Russian natural gas is particularly pronounced for the EU, as the Kremlin has a monopoly on gas pipelines into Europe and continues to prevent the emergence of a common EU stance on energy issues by making lucrative gas deals with individual member states.  While Russia is no longer the ideological enemy it was during Soviet times, dependence on Russian energy lessens the influence of Europe (which is aligned with the U.S. on a variety of issues) over a resurgent, and at times antagonistic, Russia.  

At the same time, Russia is dependent on its customers in Europe: more than 50% of Russia’s energy exports are traded with the European block, providing a substantial portion of the Russian economy.  Russia needs the revenues from the European market and the funding and expertise that Europe can provide to its crumbling and inefficient gas industry.  

BACKGROUND
Natural gas is an efficient fuel that is used primarily in the West for heating purposes.  Over 25% of known global natural gas reserves are on Russian territory, which gives Russia significant leverage over westward supply, especially because Moscow also controls most of the pipelines that connect additional gas fields in Central Asia to Europe.  After the anarchic process of privatization in post-Soviet Russia during the Yeltsin period, the government has now taken complete control of the gas industry through the state-owned monopoly, Gazprom (of which Russia’s new President Dmitry Medvedev is chairman).  As a result, European dependency on Kremlin controlled gas has been growing over the years, with the inevitable result that supply has metamorphosed from an economic into a political and strategic issue.  Disputes between Russia and its Western neighbors in Europe have led to supply disruptions on numerous occasions: Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine have all experienced gas crises as a result of disputes with Moscow.  By one assessment, political considerations played a part in more than half of the disruptions to Russian gas supplies between 1991 and early 2006.

Europe, therefore, is seeking to build additional energy pipelines that do not traverse Russia, such as the Nabucco pipeline, which will carry gas from Turkey to Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.  However, the Nabucco construction process will take years, will be dependent on gas from other countries with which Europe has difficult political relationships, such as Iran, and due to supply constraints will not provide a direct alternative for Russian gas resources.   Moreover, Russia itself is constructing a $15 billion South Stream pipeline to carry gas across the Black Sea to central Europe via the Balkans (to which several European countries have already signed up), and the Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic, strongly supported by Germany.  Gazprom insists further that it should be allowed to invest in downstream European energy distribution networks, stoking European fears of even greater reliance on Russian controlled gas.  

ANALYSIS
Progress on this issue requires recognition that there is both mutual distrust and a mutual dependence between the EU and Russia.  A coherent European policy approach to address this problem will only develop through selectivity and prioritization.  Not unlike the various strategies the United States is beginning to use to reduce its own dependence on energy from unstable or unfriendly regimes, Europe needs a multifaceted approach to engagement with Russia.

First, the European energy market is presently fragmented along national lines and dominated by a few large firms.  Liberalization and integration would improve Europe’s energy security by fostering gas supply diversity, especially in those Eastern European countries that are highly dependent on Russia.  It would also allow for the development of a common European policy on natural gas, preventing the plethora of current and often contradictory national policies.
 
Second, there is little alternative to Russian gas supplies over the short and medium-term.  At the same time, lack of Russian funding in the industry will prevent the development of reserves that Europe needs in the long-term.  An opening up of the Russian energy sector through the EU Energy Charter (a 1994 agreement not yet ratified by Russia that aims to strengthen the rule of law on energy issues and would allow European countries to invest in the Russian energy sector) would encourage upstream investment in Russian gas infrastructure, thereby improving future supply stability.  

Third, alternative delivery options will require further exploration.  More attention must also be paid to the security of pipelines and shipping for gas transportation.  The North Atlantic Treaty Association (NATO) increasingly sees energy security as a central concern for the alliance, and NATO members are now beginning to think about how to leverage and potentially expand existing cooperation fora and operations to prevent and mitigate energy crises.      

Finally, support for good governance, transparency, and economic diversification, through mechanisms such as the EU Neighborhood Policy in the Black Sea region or a ‘modernization alliance’ with Russia, will be essential.  Europe must work closely with its allies around the world, including the U.S., to ensure that energy security is maintained through political and economic stability in those countries that produce and transport natural gas.    

European leaders will meet their counterparts from the Kremlin again in September to continue discussions on the parameters of the new EU-Russian partnership.  In preparation, serious and constructive debate on energy security and natural gas supply considerations must take place within the EU and with European allies such as the U.S.  Given ever increasing energy demand, collaborative efforts to develop a sound approach to dealing with Russia over the coming years is essential, not only for European energy security but also as a platform for a renewed and constructive foreign policy from the next administration in the United States.
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Mr. Glencorse represented the United Kingdom at the Young Atlanticist Summit, held in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Bucharest, in March 2008.

DEVELOPMENTS
On July 14th, 2008, International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Louis Moreno-Ocampo requested an arrest warrant for the President of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, on the charges of committing crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide in Darfur.  This is the first time that the ICC has ever brought genocide charges; it's also the first time that the Court has brought charges against a sitting head of state. 

In accordance with ICC procedure, the pre-trial judges must now decide whether the Prosecutor has submitted enough evidence to justify issuing an arrest warrant, a process that can take up to three months. Considering the ICC’s history, it is highly likely that the pre-trial judges will agree with Ocampo and issue the warrant, which would oblige state parties to the ICC to arrest al-Bashir if he enters their territory.  Non-signatory United Nations (U.N.) member states like the U.S. should also arrest al-Bashir and transfer him to the Court.  If the Court does issue a warrant, the U.N. Security Council would still have the power to intervene and could suspend the investigation by ‘deferring’ the warrant for a renewable period of one year. 
 
BACKGROUND
Sudan has experienced almost constant civil war since its independence in 1956, including a long-running conflict between northern and southern Sudan which only ended in 2005.  A separate conflict erupted in Darfur—a region in the west of the country—in February 2003.  The rebels accused the Government in Khartoum of neglecting Darfur.  They also claimed that the Government favored Arab, pastoral tribes over non-Arab, predominantly agricultural tribes.  

The Sudanese Government responded by waging a brutal counter-insurgency campaign, using militia drawn from Arab tribes in the region to attack those tribes which supported the rebels.   The militia, often referred to as the Janjaweed, responded by killing civilians, raping women, and burning villages to the ground.  As of 2008, the UN estimates the death toll is around 300,000, while over 2.4 million people have been forced to flee their homes.  A peace agreement signed between the Sudanese Government and one of the rebel groups in May 2006 failed to stop the conflict. 

In March 2005, the U.N. Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor, citing reports of repeated violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. The International Criminal Court, is located in the Hague and was established in 2002 by the Rome Statute, an international treaty signed by 106 countries, known as State Parties. The Court has the mandate “to end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.” Cases can be iinitiated by the ICC Prosecutor, or can be referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party or by the U.N. Security Council. Since its establishment the Court has issued indictments against individuals accused of committing war crimes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, the Central African Republic and Darfur.

Prosecutor Ocampo’s case against President al-Bashir alleges that al-Bashir ordered Janjaweed attacks on civilians, in order to destroy the tribes seen supporting the Darfur rebel groups.  Specifically, the Prosecutor argues that al-Bashir bears criminal responsibility in relation to ten counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

The situation is complicated by the fact that al-Bashir plays a key role in determining the success or failure of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the north-south civil war.  His support would also be necessary for any peace agreement in Darfur to have any chance of success.  Finally, if he chooses to apply pressure it could lead to cessation of cooperation with U.N. presence and humanitarian relief operations in Sudan that keep alive millions of people in Darfur. As Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, authors of ‘Darfur: A Short History of a Long War’ write, “this prosecution will endanger the people we wish to defend in Darfur.”

Assuming that the ICC will issue a warrant, then the question becomes whether the U.N. Security Council will defer the case.  A number of Security Council members – including Britain and France – are against deferral.  They are joined by a number of civil society and human rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch and the International Centre for Transitional Justice, who believe that justice and peace can go together. They argue that deferring the case would damage the credibility of the ICC, that a political body like the UN should not interfere with an independent judicial process, and that that trying to bring to justice those most responsible actually helps promote peace, citing the prosecutions of Charles Taylor in Liberia and Radovan Karadzic in Serbia.

Some Security Council members – including China, Russia and South Africa – are opposed to the ICC prosecution, as is the African Union.  They argue that the ICC indictment could endanger prospects for peace in Sudan, and that no peace agreement is possible without al-Bashir’s involvement and support. 

ANALYSIS
The two main issues at stake regarding the ICC’s prosecution of al-Bashir are (1) peace and justice for people in Darfur and throughout Sudan, and (2) the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ICC itself.  One possible solution is to use the threat of prosecution as leverage to convince al-Bashir to make peace in Darfur by taking specific, constructive steps without delay.  If he agrees to do so, then Security Council could defer the prosecution for renewable periods of one year, provided al-Bashir’s cooperation continues.   This option does not de-legitimize the ICC: it is the constructive use of a mechanism that was put in place for exactly the situation we are facing now.

In a broader perspective, this case forces us to think about the political and security implications of implementing justice and building peace at the same time.  If the arrest warrant is not deferred, the issue becomes how al-Bashir will react. As some fear, it might lead to a deteriorating prospect for peace in Sudan. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated on the tenth anniversary of the ICC that “we must seek the right balance between the duty of justice and the pursuit of peace.” This balance is exactly what the Security Council, and especially veto-wielding members like the U.S., have to decide upon.

 

DEVELOPMENTS
On Sunday July 20th, 2008, former hostage and Colombian Senator Ingrid Betancourt led a demonstration to end the longstanding conflict between Colombia and the guerrilla group that captured her, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).  Global demonstrations in France, Colombia, and elsewhere joined Ms. Betancourt’s efforts to end FARC violence,and have resulted in thousands of calls for peace in Colombia and an end to kidnapping, a common practice of the guerrillas.

In recent months, the Colombian state launched a series of successful military initiatives against FARC.  Incursions by the Colombian military included an operation into Ecuadorian soil that resulted in the capture of a laptop detailing FARC operations. The raid also resulted in the death of Mr. Reyes, a top commander who has been cited as a potential replacement for Manuel “Tirofijo” Marulanda, FARC’s recently deceased top commander.  It seems to have been a turning point for successful Colombian operations against the guerrillas.

BACKGROUND
FARC is a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla groupbased in remote areas of Colombia where the state has no effective control.  FARC was established in 1964 as the military branch of the Communist Party.  FARC is not the only guerrilla group that remains active in the country, since the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), also known as the National Liberation Army, still remains active in Colombia.  However, FARC is by far the largest and best-financed guerrilla group, not only in Colombia, but within the entire Western Hemisphere, with an estimated 9,000 to 12,000 combatants.

The roots of the Colombian conflict are deep. The source of the conflict may be traced to the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1948, the presidential candidate for Colombia’s Liberal party. His death sparked a period of internecine conflict, known as “La Violencia” or “the Violence.”  Although a power sharing agreement effectively ended La Violencia, the seeds of the present conflict had already been sown.  FARC emerged in Colombia in the 1960s, at a time where Colombia, like other Latin American countries, witnessed the rise of multiple leftist revolutionary movements in reaction to endemic poverty, social inequality, and the success of the Cuban revolution.

The factors fueling Colombia’s current protracted conflict have been compounded by drug trafficking, as organized crime has dominated the worldwide supply of cocaine for decades.  The rise of cocaine exports in the late 1970s not only provided a source of funding for guerrilla organizations, but also contributed to Colombia’s security crises and undermined the nation’s institutions. FARC and other guerrilla groups began to supplement their incomes by exacting taxes from narco-traffickers and kidnapping wealthy Colombians for high ransoms.

Columbia’s situation became even more complicated in the 1980s with the emergence of strong paramilitary groups-- illegally armed right-wing military forces within the country.  The paramilitaries began as landowner self-defense groups formed largely with the consent and often the direct support of the Colombian military, but they eventually evolved into yet another threat to the rule of law in Colombia.  As many as 75% of political murders in Colombia have been perpetrated by paramilitaries, reports Human Rights Watch, a U.S.-based NGO.

Throughout the evolution of the conflict, the Colombian government has engaged in an alternating carrot-and-stick approach in dealing with both FARC and the paramilitaries. While the government engaged in multiple attempts to negotiate with FARC, the last serious effort to compromise ended in failed peace talks led by then-President Andres Pastrana in 2002. In 2004, Alvaro Uribe was elected president on a platform of public security that advocated a strict policy against FARC, which now in his administration’s second term appears to have been quite successful.

ANALYSIS
The recent string of operations against FARC reveals that the organization is in disarray. The death of Mr. Marulanda and Mr. Reyes deprived FARC of two members of its six-person leadership secretariat. The murder of FARC commander Ivan Rios by his own troops, who then collected bounty on his head, is evidence of the declining morale within FARC. The July 2nd raid freeing 15 hostages, including Ms. Betancourt, dramatically highlighted FARC’s seeming decline to the world.

Moreover, FARC has clearly lost the battle for public support. While fewer than 5% of Colombians support FARC’s activities, domestic support for Mr. Uribe and his anti-FARC policies has skyrocketed above 90%. Moreover, the intensifying international spotlight on FARC’s inhumane treatment of captives has pressured many prominent longtime sympathizers such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Cuba’s Fidel Castro to publicly distance themselves from FARC and its tactics.

These developments suggest that the end of FARC is imminent. However, the Colombian government estimates FARC still has 700 hostages under its control in remote jungle areas, although it is likely that the actual number is lower.  Besides FARC’s long history of struggle and the commitment of its top brass, the illegal cocaine trade between Colombia and the U.S. remains a lucrative multibillion-dollar industry that continues to finance FARC’s operations. These factors make the likelihood of a rapid collapse less likely.

A key determinant of FARC’s future will be how President Uribe’s government or any subsequent administration implements policies to deal with the terrorist group.  President Uribe may get yet another term to continue his anti-FARC policies: while he has faced several major scandals relating to close ties between his political party and the AUC, as well as the use of a Red Cross badge by Colombian guerrillas in the rescue of Ms. Betancourt, the government’s success in tackling FARC has led to growing political momentum to amend the Colombian constitution to permit Mr. Uribe to run for a third term. Thus, it is unclear who will emerge as Colombia’s next president.

FARC has historically proven adept at utilizing periods of political dialogue to strengthen itself militarily, thus it may again attempt to seek a similar strategy of in looking to reform its leadership structure.  It is unclear how Alfonso Cano, the new FARC leader, will deal with mounting domestic and international pressure to free the hostages that remain under his control.

While past attempts at negotiation with FARC have proven unsuccessful, the FARC has arguably never been in such a precarious position.  It appears possible that both sides will be more open to genuinely pursuing a lasting peace with dignity than ever before. The next few months are likely to prove crucial in whether permanent peace in one of the world’s most intractable conflicts may finally be within reach.  Even such an agreement, however, could be a source of continued instability, as the demobilization of this guerrilla group would create serious power gaps in the international cocaine trade.

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Mr. Salicrup has written and worked on rule of law issues and development in Latin America.  He holds a B.A. in anthropology from the University of Chicago and his M.A. in Latin American Studies from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is presently pursuing his J.D. at the University of Pennsylvania. Prior to law school he worked with the Organization of American States Department of Public Security before participating in several USAID funded initiatives in the Americas.