BACKGROUND

The Rose Revolution captured international attention when Georgians took to the streets in November 2003 to protest massive fraud in the presidential election. One year later, it was Ukraine's turn: the Orange Revolution therein yielded a reform government in January 2005. Although the transition to democracy in each of these countries began with the break-up of the Soviet Union, both former republics had slid back into authoritarian rule over the 1990s. Mr. Saakashvili in Georgia and Mr. Yushchenko in Ukraine each came into office promising to initiate genuine democratic reforms, improve social conditions, and guide their respective countries to a future in Europe.

As revolution gave way to the challenges of governing, however, the disappointments mounted and euphoria began to fade. In Georgia, even before the recent crackdown, President Saakashvili drew criticism for his tough governing style. While he has counted many successes, specifically delivering on campaign promises of growth, reform, and improvement in infrastructure, some analysts question whether Saakashvili's consolidation of power is consistent with his professed commitment to democratic ideals. Likewise, the current crisis is viewed as his own making. It is not disputed that Russia has actively sought to undermine Saakashvili's government through economic sanctions and harassment, among other tactics. But it is far from clear that Russia had any role in the recent protests. Moreover, the government's heavy-handed response appears only to have underscored the opposition's complaints. The concession of early elections meets a key opposition demand, but the circumstances make it unlikely that the campaign will be fully free and fair.

Yet where concentration of power has cast doubt on democracy in Georgia, governance in Ukraine has been constrained largely by its lack of unity. The September elections were held at President Yushchenko's decree to resolve a standoff with Prime Minister Yanukovich, whom he accused of using corrupt means to usurp power. The broader aim was to stabilize the political situation in a country where elite infighting and shifting alliances have delayed the realization of many of the Orange Revolution's promises. A falling out between "orange allies" President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko led to Tymoshenko's dismissal after only seven months on the job. This paved the way for Yanukovich, the villain of the Orange Revolution, to become prime minister after the March 2006 parliamentary election. The country has since been debilitated by an ongoing power struggle between these three figures. It is particularly due to Tymoshenko's gains in this election that the parliament is likely to realign in the Orange party's favor. Still, this victory does not guarantee a resolution to messy coalition politics that have plagued the nascent democracy. Even if Tymoshenko does return to the position of prime minister, it is not clear that she and Yushchenko will be able to cooperate better the second time around. Presidential elections are due in 2009, and Tymoshenko's recent electoral support suggests that she may pose a strong challenge.

ANALYSIS

The immediate challenges facing each country are a little different, but what is at stake in both is the government's ability to pull itself out of a crisis that has spread disillusionment and derailed reforms. In Ukraine, politics continue to be dominated by personality and power, and the links between political elites and the oligarchs who control most of the country's wealth are stronger than ever. The squabbling has focused attention away from the demands of institution-building, which are indispensable to the functioning of a democratic state. Likewise, in Georgia, the concentration of power in the executive has been at the expense of capacity-building in other essential government institutions.

There is good reason for disenchantment with the region's politics. However, democracy-building requires much more than the few years that have passed, and the loss of interest may also be interpreted as impatience. In Ukraine, political competition is freer than ever before. Even more significant, the appeal to voters to resolve the crisis between the parties reflects a fundamental shift in the conduct of politics. The Orange Revolution undeniably changed the rules of the game in Ukraine. It is not yet clear whether the same can be said for Georgia; the conduct of the upcoming elections will be telling in this regard.

Still, there is no room for complacency in either case. New democracies are threatened by globalization, the influence of regional powers, and even their own leaders' ineptitude or lack of political will. In the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, success or failure to complete the transition to democracy will have regional implications. This is particularly the case as Russia continues to dismantle democracy at home and reassert itself on the international stage. Both Georgia and Ukraine have been partners to many U.S. foreign policy initiatives and look to the United States for support. Both are important energy transit routes and are becoming increasingly attractive destinations for investment. Finally, support for democratization abroad is a cornerstone of the United States' foreign policy, and the ideals of liberty and freedom it stands for are an essential tool of its soft power.

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