| Confronting Iran: Addressing the Need for a Coherent Foreign Policy |
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| January/February 2008 - Archive | ||||||
| Written by Robert Friedman and Mariana Marques | ||||||
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On December 3, 2007, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran was made public after more than a year of congressional and public demands for its release. The NIE represents the consensus view of all 16 American intelligence agencies. The key judgment of the NIE revealed that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and that the program has not been recommenced. This new assessment contradicts the 2005 NIE, which assessed with "high confidence" that Iran was determined to have a nuclear weapon and was pressing full speed ahead in its efforts to achieve this end. Iranian officials insist that the nature of their nuclear activities is peaceful and have pledged to answer all remaining questions about their country's past nuclear activities within four weeks. White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe responded that the Iranian response was not enough because "answering questions about their past nuclear activities is a step, but they still need to suspend their enrichment and reprocessing activity" and that "another declaration is no substitute for complying with the U.N. sanctions." These recent developments highlight the failure of the Bush Administration to craft a coherent Iran policy as well as the need for a candid assessment of the Iranian threat that is free of political rhetoric. BACKGROUND The United States has a complicated and often volatile history with Iran dating back many years. Iran has the world's second-largest oil reserves and from 1953 until 1979 served as a key outpost in the Middle East under a Western-installed Shah regime.
The era of current U.S. foreign policy towards Iran began with the Islamic Revolution in 1979 when Islamists loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini overthrew the ruling shah - forcing him into exile - consolidated power. Relations between the newly constituted Islamic Republic Iran and the United States became deeply antagonistic during the Islamic Revolution. This tension reached an unprecedented level on November 4, 1979, when Iranian students seized seventy United States embassy personnel and held them hostage for 444 days. Although all of the embassy workers were eventually released, the event set the stage for decades of animosity and distrust between the two nations.
The ruling structure in Iran is unique. Conservative clerical forces established a theocratic system of government with ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader. According to the constitution, he is accountable only to the Assembly of Experts. The president is the second highest ranking official in Iran. Although the president commands a high public profile, the scope of actual power is significantly trimmed by the country's constitution, which subordinates the entire executive branch to the Supreme Leader.
The current Supreme Leader of Iran is Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. Iran's current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was elected in 2005 and his term expires in 2009. Ahmadinejad's presidency has been marked by a confrontational approach towards the West and frequent incendiary remarks. For example, he has commented publicly that Israel should be "wiped off the map."
Underpinning the current tension between Iran and the United States and dominating the foreign policy agenda is one issue of singular importance to the West: Iran's development of nuclear technology. The essential controversy boils down to the true intent and purpose of Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran claims that it is not seeking to develop nuclear weapons and that its nuclear program is for civilian energy needs and research only. It will not accept a pause in its research and development because its pursuit of nuclear technology is a national right. Until recently, the Bush Administration maintained that Iran was actively seeking nuclear weapon capability.
Diplomatic relations with Iran have completely eroded in recent years and tensions have been high ever since Bush categorized Iran as part of an 'Axis of Evil' along with North Korea and Iraq in the 2002 State of the Union Address. The subsequent invasion of Iraq has put Iranian leaders on the defensive. President Bush has repeatedly accused the Iranian Revolutionary Guard of sponsoring terrorism. In recent months, members of the Bush Administration have redefined the war in Iraq as a strategic battle between the United States and Iran.
The Bush Administration has primarily sought to isolate and contain Iran, as well as focus greater energy and consideration on the option of a military strike. This has entailed, among other things, the Administration's efforts at the United Nations to impose several rounds of sanctions on the Iranian government. ANALYSIS The Bush Administration's Iran policy has been maligned from many quarters. Although the goal of President Bush's Iran strategy -for Iran to be open and transparent about its nuclear programs and ambitions - is laudible, much controversy exists over the means to achieving this end. Even within the Bush Administration there is a split: with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arguing for a continuation of a diplomatic approach, while officials in Vice President Dick Cheney's office advocating a much tougher strategy.
Many experts argue that the NIE is significant because it offers evidence that contradicts persistent White House claims of imminent Iranian nuclear danger and undermines the Administration's principal case for war. At a minimum, the newest judgments represent a stark departure from the previous assessments of Iranian nuclear weapons intentions. This development counsels towards patience.
Other foreign policy thinkers have suggested that the United State pursue a strategy of containment plus deterrence. The argument portends that just as the United States allowed China, Russia, and North Korea to obtain nuclear weapons and successfully implemented a policy of deterrence, here too the United States would be successful in engaging in deterrence against a nuclear-armed Iran.
On the other end of the spectrum, many neoconservatives argue that diplomacy and negotiation only buys the Iranians more time with which to move forward inexorably toward a nuclear capability. This view supports military action against suspected nuclear sites in Iran because the only thing worse than bombing Iran is to allow Iran to obtain a nuclear bomb.
Moreover, the fact remains that Iran is a leading state-sponsor of terrorism. Proponents of a tough Iran policy point to evidence of Iranian support for insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Gaza, where it has provided military and financial backing to militant Islamic groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas.
One element of a coherent foreign policy that is clearly lacking is a robust diplomatic effort with respect to Iran. A prudent path forward should include elements of our current strategy. This may involve working with our allies to use strong, coordinated international pressure and increased sanctions, in addition to employing both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagement. As the NIE illustrates, Iran's nuclear program is still years away from a functional nuclear weapon. Robust diplomacy must be a component of U.S. foreign policy towards Iran, and it must be given an opportunity to succeed.
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